Sudan War: Ethiopia's Relations with Port Sudan Strained Over 'Tigrayan Mercenaries'

Nov. 9 2026, Published 1:00 a.m. ET
In September 2026, a recent UN report revealed the existence of networks recruiting and transporting fighters and weapons to Sudan, warning that external support and the influx of foreign fighters were contributing to the escalation of the war and of abuses against civilians.
The mission, which was set up by the UN Human Rights Council and does not speak on behalf of the UN, concluded in its report that there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the Sudanese army had used drones supplied by foreign parties during its operations.
Since mid-April 2023, Sudan has been gripped by a devastating war between the army and the forces of the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), which has killed tens of thousands of people and forced about 14 million others from their homes, while UN figures indicate that more than 30 million Sudanese are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.
Meanwhile, relations between Ethiopia and Port Sudan have become increasingly tense in recent weeks, amid what has become known as networks recruiting fighters from the Tigray region, through financial inducements and forced conscription.
In the latest flare-up, Ethiopia asked six Sudanese diplomats to leave the consulate in the town of Assosa and gave them 48 hours to leave the country. It also reportedly withdrew three diplomats from its consulate in the city of Gedaref, in eastern Sudan, on Wednesday. Other reports said the Sudanese government had asked Ethiopian diplomats in Gedaref to leave in response to the expulsion of its representatives from Assosa.
According to Sudan Tribune, sources in Addis Ababa said it was likely that the Sudanese ambassador would be expelled and declared “persona non grata”, and the embassy closed.
The newspaper explained that Ethiopia accuses the army in Port Sudan of providing safe havens and logistical support to fighters from the “Tigray People’s Liberation Front” and the armed “Fano” groups, particularly across the Sudanese border.
Private sources told Sudan Tribune that the United Kingdom and the United States are making mediation efforts aimed at bridging the gap between Port Sudan and Addis Ababa and easing tensions.
Details of the Case
On 7 July, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told parliament that young people from Tigray were being forcibly recruited and sent to fight in Sudan, saying they were losing their lives in a war they did not understand and had no connection to. The statement amounted to an official Ethiopian accusation that recruits were being transferred to the Sudanese war.
Footage of Tigrayan fighters held captive by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), some of whom appeared to be very young, caused anger in Ethiopian circles, with comments circulating that criticised the dragging of young men into a war outside their country.
Social media users said these young men should have been with their families and in school, not on the battlefield, arguing that their appearance as prisoners in Sudan revealed the price being paid by a generation of young people as a result of recruitment campaigns and political and military conflicts in the region.
Videos circulating online showed a group of young men wearing military uniforms and speaking Tigrinya in the custody of the RSF, according to an investigation published by Sahih Al-Sudan on 6 November 2026.
In one recording, a young man says they were forced to take part in the Sudanese war after being forcibly recruited, while the commentary accompanying the clips speaks of them being lured with promises of monthly salaries of $200, according to the investigation.
According to the investigation, the pages that shared the recordings attribute these young men to the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, and say they were recruited by parties linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front before being sent to fight alongside the Sudanese army.
The Sudanese army drew on fighters from the Tigray region during the battles to retake the city of Wad Madani in January 2025. Four days after the city was recaptured, “a video recording emerged of Sudanese officer Al-Sunni Haidar thanking Tigrayan fighters for their participation in the fighting and praising their readiness to continue military operations. A number of fighters can be seen beside him in the recording. Sources said that officer Al-Sunni Haidar is linked to the terrorist Islamic Movement and the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigades, and that he helped recruit members of Tigray’s Muslim minority.”
Infantry Units
The Sudan Peace Tracker website reported on 14 May 2026 that these fighters took part as infantry units alongside the army in the battles in Gezira and Sennar states in November 2024, and that they maintain a command centre in the city of Wad Madani.
It quoted “military sources as saying that their participation came under understandings with the Sudanese army concerning an exchange of support in the event of a future confrontation with the Ethiopian government.”
In a notable development, “the report indicated that some of these fighters had been part of the Ethiopian contingent in the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and that hundreds of them were granted political asylum in Sudan after the outbreak of the Tigray war in late 2020, providing the Sudanese army with manpower that included individuals with previous military experience.”
In the same context, the Sudan War Monitor website published a report on the RSF’s capture of the Jebel Qaddam garrison, in the Bakori area east of Kurmuk, after battles with the army and its allied forces. It pointed to video recordings of prisoners whom the RSF said were Tigrayan fighters who had fought alongside the army, including a recording of a person it described as an officer in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
Wide-ranging Campaign
The investigation pointed to a wide-ranging forced recruitment campaign in the Tigray region this year. On 6 July, Human Rights Watch revealed abductions and unlawful recruitment targeting civilians, including children, some as young as 15, carried out by forces and local officials in the region since April.
The organisation documented “six cases of forced recruitment, based on interviews with 18 people, including witnesses, relatives of recruits and people who managed to escape recruitment.”
The testimonies included accounts of young men being seized from streets, homes, markets and gold-mining sites, and held in administrative offices and police stations, before being transferred to military camps in the north and south of the region.
According to Sahih Al-Sudan, the abuses were not limited to the recruits, as “the organisation spoke of relatives of young men who refused to join up being detained, families being forced to hand over their sons, as well as threats against those trying to flee recruitment.”

Fuelling the War
Sahih Al-Sudan newspaper said that “the army’s use of fighters from outside Sudan, at a time when the war continues, state institutions are collapsing and the humanitarian catastrophe is worsening, reveals the extent to which Burhan’s leadership is prepared to widen the circle of parties involved in the conflict, rather than working to end it.”
With Burhan rejecting any settlement of the conflict, Sudan has become an arena where regional interests and geopolitical calculations intersect, as he leans on international axes or offers facilities and resources in exchange for military and political support, undermining national sovereignty and turning Sudan into an arena for the conflicts of major powers.
The war has deepened Sudan’s isolation and weakened prospects of restoring international confidence in its institutions, owing to its tensions with neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya and the Central African Republic.


